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INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses private sector participation and entrepreneurship in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in
China’s far northwest, an area physically
and culturally distinct from the economic
boomtowns of the coast. Like other border
areas of China, ethnic minorities make up a
large portion of the population, 54% in Xinjiang compared to 8% in China as a whole
[XSY, 2008]1. The Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim ethnic group numbering about 8 million, primarily reside in Xinjiang’s poorer
agricultural south in oasis settlements along
the old Silk Road [Toops, 2004]. Economic reforms have been slow to reach rural
southern Xinjiang, and even now Uyghurs
primarily engage in agriculture outside the
main urban areas. In contrast, Xinjiang’s
Han Chinese-populated urban north has
benefited from state investment as an industrial hub and the focal point for private
sector activity in the region.
The private sector in Xinjiang, though small,
has in recent years attracted growing numbers of entrepreneurs and workers into urban
centres. Resources in XUAR are increasingly allocated by the market rather than the
state – an environment that, to ethnic mino1

rities, means advantages for Han who have
greater access to jobs and self-employment
opportunities due to their privileged urban
position [Bovingdon, 2004]. Though ethnic
groups such as the Uyghurs and Kazakhs
have a long history of trade and mercantilism [Roberts, 2004], most minority entrepreneurs operate informally on the fringe
of Xinjiang’s economic landscape. Rates
of private sector participation and entrepreneurship in Xinjiang thus display significant
ethnic difference. For Uyghurs, the focus of
this paper, this issue has contributed to worsening relations with Han, exacerbated by
deadly riots in July and August 2009 [Sainsbury 2009]. Thus, the growth and integration
of Uyghur entrepreneurs into the urban private sector forms a crucial step in maintaining ethnic stability in the region.
This paper builds on earlier studies of minority entrepreneurship in Xinjiang that highlight the growing importance of the private
sector for the Uyghurs. Research undertaken
by Dana (1998) focused primarily on border
trade with Kazakhstan, while a later work
by Vicziany and Zhang (2004, 2006) examined the relationship between Uyghur migration and entrepreneurship. Both studies

Figures calculated from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, hereafter XSY.
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note the low levels of Uyghur participation
in the private sector; however, there has been
no attempt to investigate the regional variation of Xinjiang’s private sector growth and
quantify Uyghur participation and entrepreneurship vis-à-vis the Han. This paper
addresses this gap by investigating two related issues: private sector concentration in
Xinjiang’s urban north and levels of participation (defined as self-employment or
employment in a private enterprise) and entrepreneurship (self-employment) between
Uyghur and Han. It forms part of a larger
empirical study that analyses the challenges
facing new minority entrepreneurs in Xinjiang and their role in development.

I first describe the growing importance of the
private sector in Xinjiang and the economic
role of the state. I then note discrepancies
between Xinjiang’s urban north and rural
south in private sector development in relation to Han in-migration. I demonstrate that
areas with a large Uyghur population have
a less developed private sector than areas
with a Han majority. I show how Uyghurs
have increasingly engaged in private sector
activity, though mostly in tertiary industries
such as commerce and catering. I conclude
by suggesting the need to foster urban minority enterprises to increase Uyghur participation in the private sector and reduce the
inter-ethnic gap.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN XINJIANG
Xinjiang’s economy differs markedly from
that of China’s coast, where the private
sector accounts for over 70% of the national GDP [Engardio, 2005]. Like other
western provinces in China, Xinjiang’s
remote location has deterred foreign trade
and investment – until the collapse of the
Soviet Union, little trade filtered through
Xinjiang’s 5,000 kilometre-long border.
Rather, the central government relied on
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC; hereafter bingtuan),
a demobilised branch of the People’s
Liberation Army, to ‘reclaim’ land and establish large-scale farming [Toops, 2004,
pp. 245-246; Seymour, 2000]. Xinjiang’s
vast resources, strategic position along the
Silk Road ‘energy corridor’ and sometimes-violent ethnic tensions have led the
central government to retain a firm grip
on the economy. Reform in border trade
has aided private sector growth, but the
economic structure of XUAR remains unbalanced and is dominated by state and
bingtuan ownership [Vicziany and Zhang,
2004, pp. 2-5).
However, while the state maintains heavy
control over Xinjiang’s economy, the number of producing units in the private sector
has steadily increased in the last few years.
The number of private enterprises (siying
qiye: 8 or more employees) rose from
3,251 to 5,099 from 2001 to 2004, and self-

employed units (getihu: less than 8 employees) increased from 643,000 to 742,000
in the same period [NBS, 2008, Table 5-16;
NBS, 2002, Table 5-18; XESY, 2006, Table
7-18]. The number of employed persons in
siying qiye and getihu has also burgeoned
with the establishment of new enterprises
(Figure 1). Several large privately-owned
enterprises from eastern China have recently established branches in Xinjiang
[Zhao, 2001, p. 218]. Local governments
now actively encourage the development
of Xinjiang’s small and medium enterprises through tax breaks, as well as providing preferential tax policies for foreignfunded enterprises (Xinjiang Daily, 2008).
In contrast, employment in the urban state
sector has followed the national downward
trend through enterprise restructuring and
massive layoffs (over 600,000 from 1995
to 2000) [Weimer, 2004, p. 179].
With declining employment in the state and
collective sectors, the private sector will be
expected to absorb surplus workers and migrants in Xinjiang. Nonetheless, while the
private sector in XUAR continues to grow,
economic development has been concentrated in the industrialised, urban north at
the expense of the rural south. In the next
section, I show how uneven development
has resulted in inequalities in private sector
growth and participation between regions
and ethnic groups.
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Figure 1. Change in employment by type of ownership, Xinjiang, 2000-2006

Source: China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) 2007 (NBS 2008: Tables 5-2, 5-13 and 5-14);
CSY 2006 (NBS 2007: Tables 5-4, 5-15 and 5-16);
CSY 2005 (NBS 2006: Tables 5-4, 5-18 and 5-19);
CSY 2004 (NBS 2005: Tables 5-4, 5-18 and 5-19);
CSY 2003 (NBS 2004: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18);
CSY 2002 (NBS 2003: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18);
CSY 2001 (NBS 2002: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18).
Calculated by author.

UNEVEN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN XINJIANG
In the PRC as a whole, selling agricultural
surplus on the market, the beginnings of
‘primitive accumulation’ [Webber, 2007] heralded the start of a dynamic, ‘home-grown’
private sector of self-employed individuals.
Today the penetration of foreign capital into
China favours urban areas, leading to higher
national rates of urban private sector employment. Yet unlike in the rest of China,
farmers in Xinjiang remained more closely
tied to the state and were often coerced into
growing cash crops, particularly cotton.
Only since 1999 have agricultural labourers
in Xinjiang been able to sell excess cotton on
the market [Chau, 2004, p. 259]. In contrast,
cities have received the majority of investment [Zhao, 2001, p. 216]. Thus the rise of

the private sector has followed urbanisation
and industrialisation of Xinjiang’s cities as a
predominantly urban phenomenon.
Table 1 illustrates the primacy of urban private sector employment in Xinjiang. There
are two main issues of note here. First, Xinjiang’s economy maintains a higher share of
urban employment than the PRC as a whole,
despite XUAR’s higher proportion of rural residents (in Xinjiang, 37.9% to 62.1%;
in China, 43.9% to 56.1%) [NBS, 2008,
Table 4-1; XSY, 2008, Table 4-1]2. Second,
Xinjiang’s rural share of private and selfemployed individuals is much lower than in
urban areas, and its percentage of self-employed individuals has actually decreased
since 1995. This can be attributed partly to

2

of public security in other years” (ibid, Table 4-1). As
other studies of Xinjiang evince gradual urbanisation
since 1949 (see Ren and Yuan, 2003), we can conclude
that a sharp decline in urban population is unlikely. As
census data are generally more accurate in Xinjiang,
revised ratios provide a better picture of overall proportions. The most recent 2005 1% census sample gives
ratios as urban = 24.4%, town = 12.8%, village = 62.8%
(calculated by author) [Xinjiang Statistical Bureau,
2007, Tables 1-1a, 1-1b and 1-1c].

Weimer (2004, p. 177) writes that “in contrast to the
rest of China, a relatively large share of Xinjiang’s population resides in urban areas, 50 percent of the total
versus 30 percent for China as a whole.” This conclusion is based on pre-2000 census data taken from the
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, which listed the urban
and rural proportion in 1999 at 52.3% and 47.7%, respectively [XSY, 2008, Table 4-1]. However, from 2000
the yearbook notes that “the total urban and rural population is calculated on the 5th national population
censuses, data of population is calculated on the annals
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Table 1. Urban and rural employment, Xinjiang and PRC, 1995-2005 (in thousand persons)

2000

1995

2005

Xinjiang

Xinjiang

PRC

Xinjiang

PRC

Total

6 622
(100%)

6 725
(100%)

629 789
(100%)

7 643
(100%)

680 274
(100%)

Urban Total

3 497
(52.8%)

3 184
(47.3%)

150 166
(23.8%)

3 604
(47.2%)

176 400
(25.9%)

Private enterprise

68
1.9%

171
5.4%

12 679
8.4%

586
16.3%

34 584
19.6%

Self-employed

270
7.7%

409
12.8%

21 361
14.2%

571
15.8%

27 777
15.7%

3 125
(47.2%)

3 541
(52.7%)

479 623
(76.2%)

4 039
(52.8%)

503 873
(74.1%)

Private enterprise

23
0.7%

52
1.5%

11 387
2.4%

85
2.1%

23 656
4.7%

Self-employed

216
6.9%

198
5.6%

29 339
6.1%

188
4.7%

21 228
4.2%

Rural Total

Source: Wiemer (2004, p. 178); CSY, 2001 [NBS, 2002, Table 5-4]; CSY, 2006 [NBS, 2007, Table 5-4].
Calculated by the author.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percent of total; others indicate percent of urban/rural.
PRC figures are for sums across provinces. Figures derived average about 10% less than the national total and
30% for urban subtotal. Wiemer (2004, p. 178) notes that this is due to a yearbook adjustment.
Percentages within rural sub-category represent employment shares exclusive of primary industries.

more rapid urbanisation since the reform period and better opportunities in cities both in
employment and in private business.
Most of Xinjiang’s urban areas, and by far
its most industrialised, are located north of
the Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains) along
the ‘northern economic belt’ stretching from
Urumqi in the east to Karamay in the west
(see Map 1). Cities here were originally established as Qing garrison outposts, bingtuan
settlements or as industrial centres during
China’s interior modernisation program that
served as conduits for state-sponsored migration and settlement [Toops, 2004]. They
have since grown rapidly. Xinjiang’s northern economic belt accounted for nearly
half of the Region’s total GDP in 2006 [XSY,
2008, Table 2-10] and 90% of its heavy industry in 1995 [Zhao, 2001, p. 216]. Each
has its designated industry: Karamay is a

petrochemical centre, Kuitun is involved in
energy production, and Changji serves as an
industrial suburb to Urumqi. Road and rail
transport link the entire economic belt to the
hub at Urumqi, where goods can be loaded
and shipped off to destinations in eastern
China and further afield.
Smaller cities in Xinjiang’s south have experienced some urban development, but to
a lesser degree owing to their poor infrastructure and vast distances from key markets
[Zhao, 2001]. A railway line from Urumqi
to Kashgar was only completed in 1999,
while the Hotan spur is not to be serviceable until 2010 [Zhou, 2008]. All of southern
Xinjiang’s border crossings are closed for at
least six months out of the year, prohibiting
overland travel. Distance from inner China
pre-empts large-scale investment from reaching most of southern Xinjiang, though
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Map 1. Prefectures, administrative districts and northern belt cities, Xinjiang

Note: Labels in bold refer to prefectures and administrative districts. Other labels refer to northern belt cities.
Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan.
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture includes the subdivisions of Tacheng Prefecture and Altai Prefecture.

the central government plans to invest heavily in select southern cities [Zhao, 2001,
pp. 216‑217]. Economic restructuring in
Xinjiang delegates agricultural production
and oil extraction as the south’s primary
activities; however, Tarim Basin oilfields
continue to be unprofitable for Xinjiang’s
residents and most southern inhabitants are
involved in small-scale subsistence farming
with little income [Becquelin, 2004].
Private sector development has followed
government investment and infrastructure
in the urban north and has grown rapidly.
Maps 2-5 illustrate the density of producing
units and employed persons in both private
sector classifications (getihu and siying qiye)
for 2004 in each Xinjiang prefecture and
prefecture-level city. In both cases, southern
Xinjiang displays less density of private sector activity than the north.
Nearly all northern prefectures and administrative districts display greater density
of getihu and siying qiye than those in the
south, particularly the northern belt cities
of Urumqi and Karamay and Changji Hui
Autonomous Prefecture (hereafter AP). In
the south, Aksu Prefecture exhibits a slightly higher ratio of enterprises per thousand

population than other southern districts, largely due to the presence the Ayal bingtuan
unit [Toops, 2004, p. 258]. XPCC members
are no longer guaranteed labour in Xinjiang
and many choose to participate in the private
sector [Wiemer, 2004, p. 178], which boosts
the density of getihu and siying qiye in Aksu.
Bayingolin AP also has much private activity as it includes Korla, a boomtown built on
energy resources. Ili Kazakh AP in the north
supports border ports and cooperative zones conducive to private trade [Zhao, 2001,
p. 216]. In contrast, the southern districts of
Kizilsu Kyrgyz, Kashgar and Hotan display
extremely low densities of self-employed
household units and private enterprises.
The critical issue is that not only have industrial development and investment been
concentrated in Xinjiang’s urban north, but
that the northern ‘economic belt’ and surrounding industrial cities contain a large majority
of Han residents. Many are migrants from
eastern China, arriving since de-collectivisation and the establishment of the household
responsibility system in 1978 that prompted
a second ‘looser’ phase of Han migration
into Xinjiang [Ren and Yuan, 2003, p. 96].
From 1953 to 2006 the Han population
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Maps 2-5. Private sector producing units and employed persons by prefecture/district, Xinjiang, 2004
(figures are per thousand population)

Source: Xinjiang Economic Census Yearbook [XESY, 2006, Tables 1-9 and 7-18];
XSY, 2007 (2008, Tables 4-7 and 4-12); XSY, 2005 (2006, Tables 4-5 and 4-7).
Calculated by author.
Note: Getihu = less than 8 employees; siying qiye = 8 or more employees.
Note: Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan and not included in the analysis.

increased its share of Xinjiang’s total population from to 6.1% to 39.6% [Toops,
2004, p. 246; NBS, 2008, Table 4-7]. Though many recent migrants are skilled, those
lacking a household registration permit, or
hukou, comprise Xinjiang’s ‘floating population’ that reside in Xinjiang’s urban areas,
particularly in the north [Solinger, 1995].
Bingtuan members are also overwhelmingly Han at 88.8% of total membership [Seymour, 2000]. At the same time, Xinjiang’s
Uyghurs and ethnic minorities predominate
in rural areas (Table 2) and in southern Xinjiang (Maps 6-7).
The majority of Uyghurs in Xinjiang inhabit a series of oasis settlements and rural townships surrounding the southern
Tarim Basin, primarily in the Kizilsu Kyrgyz, Kashgar and Hotan districts. However, substantial populations are present in

the eastern towns of Turpan (Tulufan) and
Qumul (Hami), both known for fruit production, and the traditional centre of Gulja
located in Ili Kazakh AP on the border
with Kazakhstan. Xinjiang’s thirteen other
recognised minority groups are also predominantly rural, and many (particularly
Kazakhs) reside in the northern grasslands,
mostly in Ili Kazakh AP [Benson and Svanberg, 1998]. In contrast, the Han population
primarily resides in Xinjiang’s larger ‘northern belt’ cities and in other northern areas
linked by rail to eastern China. One exception is Korla, located in the sparsely inhabited Bayingolin Mongol AP, which boasts a
large Han population that significantly increases the Han share in the prefecture [Ma,
2003, p. 113]. When divided into north and
south, Xinjiang thus displays considerable
ethnic difference in population.
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Table 2. Urban and rural population shares, Xinjiang, 2004 (%)
Shares within groups

Shares between groups

Han

City
43.1

Town
15.2

Village
41.7

City
70.4

Town
47.1

Village
26.5

Uyghur
Other Minorities

10.4
1.8

10.1
15.7

79.5
66.5

20.0
9.6

36.8
16.1

59.5
14.0

Source: Xinjiang 1% Population Census Sample 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Bureau 2007: Tables 1-1a, 1-1b,
1-1c, 2-1, 2-1a, 2-1b and 2-1c).
Calculated by author.

Maps 6-7. Ethnic shares by prefecture/district, Xinjiang, 2006

Source : XSY, 2007 (2008, Tables 4-7, 4-12, 21-2).
Note: Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan and not included in the analysis.

Bachman (2004) charges the central government of ‘Han economic imperialism’ in Xinjiang and argues that the main beneficiaries
of economic development are urban Han.
‘Internal colonialism’ may not capture the
dynamic of Han and urban-centric development in Xinjiang [Sautman, 2000], but it
does illuminate the economic inequalities
between the north and south and therefore,
Han and Uyghur. Statistical data comparing
living standards of China’s minorities is
unavailable in the PRC [Bovingdon, 2004,
p. 40], but existing census figures demons-

trate that the Uyghur ‘traditional heartland’
in southern Xinjiang shows poorer economic
growth, lower GDP per capita and less private sector development in than in the Han-populated north. Additionally, Wiemer (2004,
p. 177) has constructed a regression equation that demonstrates that, when controlling
for agriculture, every one-percent increase
in Han population corresponds with an increase in per capita GDP of 44¥. These figures together suggest that Uyghurs are more
economically disadvantaged and have less
access to the private sector than Han.

GAUGING UYGHUR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Regional disparity in economic development
and in the density of privately-owned units
seems to demonstrate ethnic divisions in private sector participation. Several researchers
note poor minority performance in the private

sector in Xinjiang [Vicziany and Zhang, 2004;
Wiemer, 2004]. Other studies conclude that
Han retain easier access to jobs, education
the private sector than Uyghurs due to their
privileged urban position [Bovington, 2004].
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Indeed, the location of most Uyghurs in rural
areas outside the main economic centres precludes them from private sector participation
and entrepreneurship. While preferential policies have accounted for better Uyghur participation in higher-salaried staff-and-worker positions (zhigong) [Hopper, 2005, pp. 46-47],
these policies are not extended to the private
sector [Bovingdon, 2004, p. 37]. Accordingly, Uyghurs experience difficulty in securing
private sector employment, often because
Han business owners prefer Han employees
[Gilley, 2001]. Thus, we would expect both
Uyghur private sector participation and entrepreneurship to be low vis-à-vis the Han.

There is little statistical evidence to help
determine Uyghur participation and entrepreneurship in the private sector. However,
comparisons of workforce shares between
ethnic groups in different industries shed
some light on the degree of Uyghur private
sector participation. Table 3 gives shares
between ethnic groups both for agriculture
and for non-farm industries, taken from the
2000 census ‘long form’ sample. Han exhibit higher shares in all non-farm industries,
particularly in manufacturing, resource extraction and construction positions that offer better remuneration (see Hopper, 2005,
p. 42).

Table 3. Ethnic shares between groups by industry, Xinjiang, 2000 (%)

Total
Agriculture & primary industries
Non-farm industries
Extractive
Manufacturing
Construction
Transport/storage
Commerce/catering
Commercial services
Social services
Other

Han

Uyghur

Other
minorities

41.4
25.1
67.2
75.9
70.6
89.5
72.3
66.9
77.6
56.4
58.6

45.6
59.9
23.0
14.4
23.0
7.3
18.2
23.2
13.1
30.2
28.2

13.0
15.0
9.8
9.8
6.3
3.2
9.4
9.9
9.3
13.4
13.2

Source: Xinjiang Population Census 2000 (2002, Table C2-1).
Data from long form. Calculated by author.
Note: Commercial services includes: ‘finance and insurance’ and ‘real estate’. Social services includes: ‘social
services’, ‘hygiene, sport and social welfare’ and ‘education, culture and art, radio, film and television’. All other
categories classified as other.

However, much of this disparity in secondary and tertiary sector employment between
ethnic groups is due to the high percentage
of the Uyghur population being employed
in agriculture. Noticeable Uyghur shares
of trade and catering services (23.2%) and
manufacturing (23.0%) thus suggest some
level of participation. When considering
shares within ethnic groups, commerce/catering and manufacturing account for 7.8%
of total Uyghur employment and, importantly, 40.1% of Uyghur non-farm employment [Xinjiang Population Census 2002,
Table C2-1]. Thus, to obtain a better picture
of Uyghur private sector participation within the ethnic group, we should examine
overall employment of the non-farm work-

force only. In Table 4, shares within ethnic
groups are divided by the proportion of the
ethnic group engaged in non-farm activities, demonstrating that Uyghurs outside
agriculture migrate toward employment in
other industries, particularly commerce.
When shares within groups for the nonfarm workforce only are examined, the
percentage of Uyghurs engaged in commerce/catering and social services actually
exceeds that of Han, while reaching similar levels in manufacturing and transport.
Shares for other minorities experience a
similar jump. Since a large proportion of
Xinjiang’s private sector is skewed toward
commerce and transport [see XESY, 2006,
Tables 1-9 and 7-18], these figures suggest
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Table 4. Ethnic shares (non-farm workforce) within groups by industry, Xinjiang, 2000 (%)

Agriculture & primary industries
Non-farm industries
of non-farm workforce, shares in:
Extractive
Manufacturing
Construction
Transport/storage
Commerce/catering
Commercial services
Social services
Other

Other
Uyghur minorities
80.6
70.9

Total
61.4

Han
37.3

38.6

62.7

19.4

29.1

3.2
19.4

3.6
20.4

2.0
19.5

3.2
12.5

8.3
8.3

11.0
8.8

2.6
6.7

2.7
7.9

20.5
2.6
21.2
16.3

20.4
3.0
17.9
2.9

20.6
1.5
27.8
2.1

20.6
2.4
29.2
2.7

Source: Xinjiang Population Census (2002, Table C2-1). Data from long form. Calculated by author.
Note: Categories grouped as in Table 3.

that non-farm Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities may be inclined toward private
sector participation.
The census data, however, cannot accurately gauge Uyghur private sector participation, nor do they demonstrate the degree of
Uyghur involvement in entrepreneurship.
Fortunately, figures from a 1998 PRC study of minorities in Xinjiang, compiled by
Wiemer (2004, p. 180), show the density
of getihu by ethnic group, a useful gauge
of self-employment. As with industry shares between ethnic groups in Table 4, the

Uyghur population in Table 5 exhibits a
lower density of getihu than the Han population, suggesting that Uyghurs are less
inclined toward self-employment than Han.
However, if the number of getihu in nonfarm industries is divided by the proportion
of the population in the non-farm workforce,
the density of getihu for Uyghurs increases
significantly to nearly double the ratio for
the Han population (see Table 5). Not surprisingly, the majority of self-employed
Uyghurs are involved in commerce and catering, which validates the data in Table 4.

Table 5. Self-employment by ethnicity, Xinjiang, 1998 (in number of getihu per thousand
population)
Whole population

Overall
Agriculture
Extractive
Manufacturing
Construction
Transport/Storage
Commerce/Catering
Social Services
Other

Non-farm workforce

Han

Uyghur

Han

Uyghur

25.33

15.99

40.40

82.42

0.00
0.01
2.79
0.07
2.39
15.31
4.27
0.49

0.00
0.01
2.02
0.06
0.82
11.42
1.51
0.15

0.00
0.00
4.45
0.11
3.81
24.42
6.81
0.78

0.00
0.00
10.41
0.31
4.23
58.87
7.78
0.77

Source: Adapted from Wiemer (2004, p. 180).
Note: Ratios divided by ethnic non-farm workforce proportions from Table 4.
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The self-employment trends illustrated in
Table 5 suggest that low levels of Uyghur
self-employment for the whole population
are mainly due to participation in agriculture
rather than an inability to conduct business.
In fact, the non-farm Uyghur workforce
shows a much greater density of commerce
and catering getihu than Han, showing that
Uyghur self-employment outside agriculture
is actually twice as common as with Han,
particularly in commerce and restaurant/catering industries.
Furthermore, the figures in Table 5 actually
underestimate levels of Uyghur self-employment for at least two reasons. First,
Xinjiang’s private sector has grown substantially in the last decade since the 1998
getihu study was published, and Uyghur
entrepreneurship has increased with it [see
Vicziany and Zhang, 2004]. Second, much
of Uyghur self-employed activity goes uncounted in statistical data. Uyghurs who engage in informal self-employment, usually
by selling excess crops or handicrafts, may
do so without reporting their activities to the
local government office. This ‘informal’ private sector is common in both the countryside and in cities where traders and petty entrepreneurs operate without a fixed location
[Solinger, 1995]. Thus, small scale trade and
craft production among Uyghurs may not be
represented in the official data.
These official statistics and other studies of
Xinjiang demonstrate that most Uyghur entrepreneurs in Xinjiang are engaged in trade

and catering services (such as restaurants).
Many traders rent stalls in regional and urban bazaars selling goods obtained from
eastern China. Uyghur eateries abound in
Xinjiang’s cities due to their ‘cultural monopoly’ on halal food services [Vicziany
and Zhang, 2004]3. In addition, a significant
number of Uyghur merchants have forged
trade links with Central Asia, with whom
they have a cultural and linguistic affiliation.
Merchants may ‘sojourn’ in Kazakhstan or
Uzbekistan for months at a time selling
Chinese-made goods and then scour domestic markets for more products [Roberts,
2004]. Several merchants have grown quite wealthy in this way [see Vicziany and
Zhang, 2006, p. 58].
However, Uyghur merchants who have
grown accustomed to skirting customs duties on imports and exports have found increasing scrutiny at the border in recent
years [Roberts, 2004, pp. 221-224]. Many
merchants now operate through approved
channels or through urban-based import/
export agencies. In addition, Central Asian
buyers who prefer to purchase goods in bulk
now often head straight for factories in eastern China or large-scale markets in Urumqi,
rather than operating through Uyghur ‘middlemen’ [ibid, p.224]. Thus, while border
trade remains lucrative for some Uyghur
merchants, industries within the urban private sector are growing in importance, and
access to them is necessary for Uyghur business development.

CONCLUSION
This paper has described Uyghur private
sector participation and entrepreneurship
compared to Han. I have argued that while
Xinjiang’s private sector has grown in importance, self-employment and private enterprise are mostly limited to urban areas in the
north. This affects Uyghur participation and
entrepreneurship in the private sector, which
is significantly lower than Han. However,
I have demonstrated that Uyghurs outside

agriculture are more inclined toward selfemployment than Han, particularly in trade
and catering services. A survey of other recent studies [Roberts, 2004; Vicziany and
Zhang, 2004] has revealed that many Uyghur
entrepreneurs are involved in informal or
unregistered private sector activity, many as
merchants along the Central Asian border.
However, changing economic conditions
in Xinjiang are boosting the importance of

3

establishments.

Hui Muslims also own restaurants and eateries throughout Xinjiang, though Uyghurs rarely eat in Hui
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urban entrepreneurship for Uyghurs. There
is a need, then, to foster and encourage the
development of urban Uyghur enterprises
that will facilitate greater minority participation in the private sector.
In a previous study, Vicziany and Zhang
(2004, p. 13) state that Xinjiang's unique political economy (prevalence of state-owned
enterprises, the bingtuan, and central government subsidization of the economy)
make state support a key to successful entrepreneurship, and call for state funds invested in inefficient bingtuan enterprises
be redirected toward subsidies for minority
entrepreneurs. Though this would be a welcome improvement, similar funding schemes thought already to be in place have
been poorly implemented and inaccessible
for most Uyghurs. Thus, state efforts should

focus on quality implementation of funding
opportunities for enterprises as well as working toward restructuring finance channels
through banking and microfinance programs
[Park et al., 2001]. In addition, entrepreneurship training strategies similar to those
in place in other inner provinces of China
should be made more widely accessible to
Uyghurs (see ADB 2008 for a description of
these programs). These approaches should
accompany the ongoing development of
reforms tackling education, poverty and infrastructure to further promote indigenous
entrepreneurship among Uyghur communities. Uyghur entrepreneurs can provide a valuable source of employment and income for
the community, making them a vital component in reducing economic disparity and
improving ethnic relations in Xinjiang.
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